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Abstract
Legal theorists have characterized physical evidence of brain dysfunction as a double-
edged sword, wherein the very quality that reduces the defendant’s responsibility for his
transgression could simultaneously increase motivations to punish him by virtue of his
apparently increased dangerousness. However, empirical evidence of this pattern has been
elusive, perhaps owing to a heavy reliance on singular measures that fail to distinguish
between plural, often competing internal motivations for punishment. The present study
employed a test of the theorized double-edge pattern using a novel approach designed to
separate such motivations. We asked a large sample of participants (N = 330) to render
criminal sentencing judgments under varying conditions of the defendant’s mental health
status (Healthy, Neurobiological Disorder, Psychological Disorder) and the disorder’s treat-
ability (Treatable, Untreatable). As predicted, neurobiological evidence simultaneously elic-
ited shorter prison sentences (i.e., mitigating) and longer terms of involuntary hospitalization
(i.e., aggravating) than equivalent psychological evidence. However, these effects were not
well explained by motivations to restore treatable defendants to health or to protect society
from dangerous persons but instead by deontological motivations pertaining to the defen-
dant’s level of deservingness and possible obligation to provide medical care. This is the
first study of its kind to quantitatively demonstrate the paradoxical effect of neuroscientific
trial evidence and raises implications for how such evidence is presented and evaluated.
Background
Neuroscience is playing an increasing role in criminal trials. While it is unfeasible to estimate
the prevalence of neurobiological evidence in lower courts, their rates in murder trials may
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exceed five percent, as indicated by the subset of cases documented at the appellate level [1].
But brain evidence can be complicated, raising questions about how fact finders interpret the
quality of this evidence.
According to recent research, ordinary people have considerable preconceptions about the
explanatory power of neurobiological evidence. Weisberg, Taylor, and Hopkins [2], for exam-
ple, found that when lay people evaluate the quality of scientific explanations for behavior,
their ability to distinguish between good and bad quality explanations was hampered by the
presence of irrelevant neuroscience information. People judged explanations paired with the
irrelevant neuroscience information as stronger and more satisfying than explanations without
it. The investigators describe this context effect as evidence of the “seductive allure” of neuro-
scientific explanations. Furthermore, brain images, per se, may have a particularly persuasive
impact on credibility judgments (e.g., [3]; but see [4–6]).
If people perceive evidence to be stronger when it is dressed up in neuroscientific garb, to
what extent does this tendency impact legal judgments? In a study of trial court judges, Aspin-
wall, Brown, and Tabery [7], found that psychiatric testimony about a defendant’s mental ill-
ness reduced recommended prison sentence lengths when that testimony included a
description of the illness’ biological causes. Similarly, in a mock trial study, Greene and Cahill
[8] showed that in the case of high risk offenders, neuroscientific evidence of psychosis
reduced the number of death sentence recommendations compared to the diagnosis alone.
Likewise, Capestany and Harris [9] found that biological personality assessments reduced pun-
ishments compared to behavioral assessment in a mock trial study. Marshall and colleagues
[10] found that neurobiological explanations reduced perceptions of dangerousness when the
defendant is described at psychopathic. Finally, Shariff and colleagues [11] found that exposing
people to general information about the neural bases of human behavior reduced the length of
recommended prison sentences in mock trial cases.
One explanation for the apparent “seductive allure” of neurobiological evidence is that peo-
ple assume that physical causes of behavior, such as genetic or neurological causes, indicate
that the behavior is outside the agent’s ability to make free choices or to control their behavior
and therefore outside their scope of responsibility. Thus, when physical causes are more salient
than other causes, judgments should be more lenient. Consistent with this theory, Greene and
Cohen [12] have argued that advances in neuroscience sow doubt about the causal roles of
individual choice and control, and thus, the degree to which people should be held responsible
for illicit actions.
Other scholars have argued that the tendency to excuse a person of responsibility simply
because that behavior has identifiable physical causes is fallacious because, in reality, all actions
are ultimately physically determined. Morse [13] names this fallacy the “fundamental psycho-
legal error,” and suggests to the contrary that there are legitimate reasons to hold people
responsible for their actions even though those actions have physical causes (see also [14, 15]).
Fallacious or not, the inference that physical causes of a defendant’s behavior render that
behavior outside his control carries another risk. Though such inferences can reduce attribu-
tions of responsibility, scholars have warned that they can potentially increase perceptions that
the defendant is dangerous and in need of greater institutional supervision. For instance, Ber-
ryessa [16] found that potential jurors given evidence of biological risk factors rated the defen-
dant as less responsible for their acts and more likely to commit future crimes compared to
those not given biological risk factor information. This potential of biological evidence to cut
both ways in a defendant’s case has been described as a double-edged sword [7, 17–19]. If
admission of such evidence carries this risk, it has important implications for how legal parties
present evidence, how judges and jurors evaluate that evidence, and more broadly how human
beings make moral judgments.
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Despite the growing number of studies on this topic, evidence of the double-edged nature of
biological evidence has been elusive. Though biological evidence has tended to mitigate guilt
and punishment in the aforementioned studies [7, 8], other studies have shown aggravating
effects. For instance, McCabe, Castel, and Rhodes [20] found that potential jurors given incrimi-
nating fMRI lie detection evidence rendered more guilty verdicts than those given the same evi-
dence in the form of a polygraph or thermal facial imaging test, as well as those given no lie
detection evidence at all. In contrast to Greene and Cahill’s [8] observed effect of a reduction in
death sentences, Saks, Schweitzer, Aharoni, and Kiehl [21] found that when neuroimaging evi-
dence is proffered by the prosecution, death sentence recommendations increase.
Yet other mock trial studies have reported null effects of biological explanations. For exam-
ple, neurobiological evidence of psychopathic or anti-social tendencies in criminal offenders
had no effect on participant’s recommended prison sentence lengths compared to psychologi-
cal or behavioral evidence [22, 23]. Similarly, Blakey and Kremsmayer [24] found that describ-
ing a case of aggravated assault as stemming from the offender’s impaired brain activity as
opposed to his lower self-control had no significant impact on the length of prison sentence
recommended for the crime. Finally, Schweitzer, Saks, Murphy, Roskies, Sinnott-Armstrong,
and Gaudet [25] found that after conducting four experiments investigating the effects of
neurobiological evidence on criminal sentencing, a meta-analysis demonstrated no effect of
neurobiological evidence on guilt verdicts.
Despite expectations that neurobiological evidence cuts both ways, no single study has
quantitatively demonstrated both mitigating and aggravating effects side by side. One reason
could be that different studies have ignored potential attitudes about the disorder’s amenability
to treatment. Highly treatable disorders tend to reduce perceptions that the defendant contin-
ues to be a danger to others. So if a biological disorder is portrayed as treatable, punishments
should be lenient because the defendant will be perceived as low in both responsibility and
dangerousness. But if the same disorder is portrayed as untreatable, this may evoke concerns
that the defendant is dangerous even if he is less morally responsible for the crime. To our
knowledge, no previous studies have considered the potentially moderating role of treatability.
Another possible reason for the inconsistent findings is that the dependent measures used
across studies fail to capture distinct, sometimes competing, punitive motives within the same
individual. Most quantitative studies, for instance, included only a single punishment measure,
along the lines of: “How long should the offender be sentenced to prison?” or “How much
should the offender be punished?”. If a participant has both deontological concerns (e.g., that
the offender deserves to be punished for his moral transgression) and consequentialist con-
cerns (e.g., that the offender must be incapacitated because he is a danger to society), she is
forced to use a single measure to voice both types of concerns. When participants are forced to
use prison time as a “one-stop shop” to capture their diverse punitive motives, these separate
motives could interact or cancel out in unknown ways.
The present study was designed to address these limitations in a contrastive vignette experi-
ment involving the diagnosis of an impulse control disorder following a sexual assault. A sex-
ual assault crime was selected because it is one of the more plausible charges used to justify
commitment to involuntary hospitalization in many U.S. states. By explicitly manipulating
whether the neurobiological or psychological disorder is deemed treatable or untreatable, we
control for the possible dependency of neurobiological descriptions on perceived treatability
(see Ahn, Proctor, & Flanagan [26]). And, by providing participants with the option to sen-
tence the offender to prison time (designed largely for moralistic punishment) and/or inpa-
tient hospitalization time (designed largely for incapacitation but not punishment), we ensure
that if the distinct punitive motives are evoked, they may be distinguished by a simultaneous
reduction in prison and increase in involuntary hospitalization.
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A supplemental goal of this project was to explore whether the predicted effects are associ-
ated with individual differences in cognitive functioning. Individual differences in legal set-
tings are important because they can serve as sources of differential treatment of offenders.
Leading theories suggest that many context effects are caused by a tendency to attend to the
salient attributes and activate confirmatory associations in memory [27]. If so, it follows that
people who excel in counterfactual reasoning (i.e., the tendency to entertain multiple possible
perspectives or outcomes) should exhibit less susceptibility to context effects. Yet, other
research suggests that individuals with high cognitive ability are no less susceptible to cognitive
biases, and may even be even more susceptible in some cases [28]. Other theorists have empha-
sized the role of emotional regulation in context effects, suggesting that individuals who are
better able to regulate emotions (for example, to reduce their emotional reactions to affective
stimuli, such as pictures) are less susceptible to context effects due to a shift from an emotional
strategy to a cognitive strategy [29]. If so, people with high emotion regulation ability should
be less susceptible to the salience of neurobiological causes of behavior.
This study investigated the effect of brain-based evidence of an impulse control disorder on
lay sentencing judgments in a large Internet-based sample. The use of lay samples to study
judicial decision making is indirect at best. But lay samples are valuable for at least two other
reasons: They are scientifically important to the extent that they help illuminate general pat-
terns of human cognition, and they are legally important in that legal policy often relies on
public opinion, as expressed through vehicles like the election of judges and legislators and the
endorsement of ballot propositions and referenda. So, understanding punitive judgment for-
mation among laypeople can help inform criminal punishment policies and practices even if
these decisions don’t necessarily generalize to judicial decision making.
The overarching rationale of this study was that if a neurobiological explanation of an
impulse control disorder, more so than a psychological one, primes people to believe the
defendant lacked control of his actions and should therefore be held less responsible for his
crime, then such an explanation should result in reduced prison sentences. However, in this
view, the same evidence should increase support for non-punitive custody (e.g., involuntary
hospitalization) because a defendant who lacks control will also be perceived as more danger-
ous. This latter effect should be especially apparent when the defendant’s disorder is rendered
untreatable. We thus tested the following hypotheses:
H1. Neurobiological evidence of a disorder will decrease prison sentences relative to psy-
chological evidence and to no evidence.
H2. The H1 effect will be greater when the disorder is seen as treatable versus untreatable.
H3. Neurobiological evidence will increase involuntary hospitalization terms relative to
psychological evidence and to no evidence.
H4. The H3 effect will be greater when the disorder is seen as untreatable.
H5. (a) The H1 effect will be best accounted for by a reduction in deontological concerns,
and (b) the H3 effect will be accounted for by increased consequentialist concerns.
EH1. Individuals who score lower in executive functioning (counterfactual reasoning or
emotion regulation) will exhibit decreases in punishment and involuntary hospitalization rela-
tive to higher scoring individuals.
Methods
Participants
Three hundred sixty nine adults residing in the U.S. (53% F, 47% M) were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in November 2017 and paid $3.00 for participating. Thirty
nine respondents were omitted for incomplete data, missed attention checks (e.g., “What
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colors are on the American flag?”), or for spending too little time on the survey (< 1 SD of
mean, or ~5 minutes), resulting in a final sample size of 330. The average age was 36.0 years
(SD = 11.38, range = 19–71). Median annual household income was $25,000-$49,999. Political
party affiliation was 43.9% democratic, 29.0% independent, 15.5% republican, and 15.6%
other. Human subject research was authorized by the Georgia State University institutional
review board: H16349. Written consent was obtained from all participants.
The use of MTurk for research purposes has been documented elsewhere [30]. Like most
sampling methods, use of the MTurk sampling pool presents some limitations on generaliz-
ability to the U.S. population, most notably in terms of political party affiliation, for which our
sample disproportionately identified as democratic. However, this pool has been validated for
research on political ideology [31]. More broadly, the MTurk sampling pool, and our sample
in particular, are more representative on basic U.S. demographics, as defined by the 2017 U.S.
Census, than other methods commonly employed in social science research such as the use of
university students.
Sample size estimation
The estimated sample size was determined by the power required to detect a significant inter-
action of mental health status (neurobiological vs. psychological) and treatability status (treat-
able vs. untreatable) on recommended punishment, assuming that the probability of obtaining
a false positive is α = 0.05. Under this assumption, a sample of 327 participants provides 95%
power to detect a significant interaction in this design where the effect size is f = 0.20 (a small
effect size by conventional criteria; [32]).
Design
The study used a 3 (Mental Health Status) x 2 (Treatability Status) incomplete factorial design
with random assignment to conditions. Mental health status varied whether the defendant was
described as having an impulse control disorder of neurobiological origins, of psychological
origins, or was healthy. Treatability status varied whether the impulse control disorder was
seen to be completely treatable or untreatable, but only for the neurobiological and psychologi-
cal conditions, not the healthy condition. The primary dependent measures consisted of a pre-
liminary, baseline prison sentence recommendation made before exposure to the
manipulations, a revised prison sentence recommendation after the presentation of manipula-
tions, and the amount of time the defendant should involuntarily spend in an inpatient hospi-
tal after the completion of his prison term (all from 0 to 4 yrs. as determined from unpublished
pilot data). Change in prison sentence recommendation was calculated as the within-subject
change from baseline—the difference between their baseline and revised prison sentence rec-
ommendation. In order to account for individual-level variation in punishment judgments, a
composite punishment score was constructed, defined as the individual’s revised sentence
divided by his/her baseline punishment recommendation, yielding a percentage change score
for each participant. Exploratory measures were designed to check and clarify the results of
our hypothesis tests. These consisted of Likert-type ratings (from (1) “Strongly Disagree” to
(7) “Strongly Agree”) for various statements regarding the defendant’s moral responsibility,
blameworthiness, desert of punishment, free will, ability to stop himself, trustworthiness, dan-
ger to society, likelihood of reoffense, the degree to which the crime was an expression of his
character, the perceived efficacy of treatment, and the perceived impact and importance of the
evidence on their punishment decision.
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Materials
The case summary described an instance of sexual assault in which an adult male was found
guilty of assaulting an adult female neighbor. (See S1 Appendix for stimuli.) Following receipt
of this information, the participants were presented with a professional opinion regarding Mr.
Edward’s mental status from either neurologists, psychologists, or “experts”—corresponding
to our neurobiological, psychological, and healthy conditions, respectively. Participants were
either informed that the neurologists had located a large tumor in the impulse control region
of the defendant’s brain, that the psychologists had diagnosed the defendant with an impulse
control disorder, or that the experts had determined that the defendant had no mental health
issues. Within the neurobiological condition, participants were told that the neurologists either
conducted surgery to successfully remove the tumor (treatable condition), or found it to be
inoperable (untreatable condition). Similarly, those within the psychological condition were
told that cognitive-behavioral therapy was either a success (treatable condition) or a failure
(untreatable condition). Those within the healthy condition were given no further informa-
tion. Aside from these manipulations across conditions, all participants received identical
information.
Three additional measures were included after the dependent measures to assess individual
differences. The Counterfactual Thinking (CFT) scale is used to assess the ability to reason
counterfactually, as well as a measure of perspective switching and open mindedness—For
example: “My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set
of parents” [33]. The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale-Short Form (DERS-SF) is
meant to assess an individual’s ability to regulate his or her emotions [34]. Following these
additional scales, participants self-reported his or her political ideology from (0) “very liberal”
to (10) “very conservative”.
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the survey privately on their personal devices. After pro-
viding consent, they were instructed to read carefully through a summary of a criminal court
case, and to imagine as if they were the judge overseeing the trial. After the case summary, the
dependent measures were presented followed by several manipulation checks, validated inven-
tories, and supplemental questions. Finally, participants provided demographic information
including age, gender, political affiliation, and income.
Results
Hypothesis tests
(H1) Were prison sentence recommendations decreased when evidence for the defen-
dant’s disorder was described as neurobiological as compared to psychological? (H2) Was
this effect greater when the disorder was treatable?. Revised prison sentence recommenda-
tions were subjected to a two-way Analysis of Variance with two mental health status condi-
tions (neurobiological, psychological) and two treatability status conditions (treatable,
untreatable). There was a main effect of mental health status on prison sentencing, F(1, 219) =
13.07, p< .001, ηp2 = .056, (Partial eta-squared effect sizes are interpreted using the following
benchmark values, suggested by Richardson [35]: .0588�medium < .1379.) indicating, as
predicted, that when neurobiological evidence was given as an explanation for the underlying
disorder, participants recommended significantly shorter sentences (M = 0.95, SE = 0.14) than
when psychological evidence was given (M = 1.65, SE = 0.14). The same pattern of results was
found using the change in prison recommendation, F(1, 219) = 6.18, p = .014, ηp2 = .027, as
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well as when subjected to a one-way ANOVA including the healthy condition, F(2, 327) =
33.64, p< .001, η2 = .171. Pairwise comparisons (Fisher’s LSD) showed that, as predicted, the
recommended prison sentence was significantly shorter when the defendant had a disorder
supported by neurobiological evidence (M = 0.95, SE = 0.13, p< .001) or psychological evi-
dence (M = 1.65, SE = 0.13, p< .001), than when the defendant was healthy (M = 2.49, SE =
0.14). Similarly, the disorder supported by neurobiological evidence garnered significantly
shorter prison sentences than the disorder supported by psychological evidence, p< .001. To
assess whether the introduction of any health related information altered prison sentences, a
two-tailed paired t-test was conducted within the healthy condition before and after disclosure
that the defendant was, in fact, in good mental health. As anticipated, there was a null effect, t
(106) = 1.46, p = .15, indicating that participants likely assumed that the defendant was of
sound mental health, by default, before any evidence was presented.
As expected, there was a main effect of treatability status on prison sentencing, F(1, 219) =
7.18, p = .008, ηp2 = .032, indicating that when participants were told the defendant’s disorder
was treatable, they recommended significantly shorter prison sentences (M = 1.04, SE = 0.14)
than when participants were told the disorder was untreatable (M = 1.56, SE = 0.14). However,
there was no significant interaction between the mental health status presented and the treat-
ability of the disorder, F(1, 219)< 0.001, p = .99, ηp2 < .001. The same pattern of results was
found using the change in prison recommendation, F(1, 219) = 13.95, p< .001, ηp2 = .060 and
F(1, 219) = 0.073, p = .79, ηp2 < .001, respectively. As a whole, these results were consistent
with H1 but not H2. See Table 1 for sentencing recommendations by condition.
(H3) Were involuntary hospitalization terms increased when evidence for the defen-
dant’s disorder was described as neurobiological as compared to psychological? (H4) Was
this effect greater when the disorder was untreatable?. Recommended involuntary hospi-
talization terms were subjected to a two-way Analysis of Variance with two mental health sta-
tus conditions (neurobiological, psychological) and two treatability status conditions
(treatable, untreatable). There was a main effect of mental health status on recommended
involuntary hospitalization terms, F(1, 219) = 4.07, p = .045, ηp2 = .018, indicating, as pre-
dicted, that when neurobiological evidence was given as an explanation for the defendant’s
underlying disorder, participants recommended significantly longer recommended involun-
tary hospitalization terms (M = 1.99, SE = 0.12), than when psychological evidence was given
(M = 1.65, SE = 0.12). Participants’ change in prison sentence and involuntary hospitalization
terms were negatively correlated, r(223) = -.38, p< .001, suggesting a perceived trade off
between these decision outcomes. The same pattern of results was found when recommended
involuntary hospitalization terms were subjected to a one-way ANOVA, including the healthy
condition, F(2, 327) = 42.99, p< .001, η2 = .208. Pairwise comparisons showed that, as pre-
dicted, the recommended involuntary hospitalization term was significantly longer when the
defendant’s disorder was described neurobiologically (M = 1.99, SE = 0.12, p< .001) as well as
Table 1. Revised prison sentence and involuntary hospitalization recommendations as a function of mental health status and treatability.
Psychological Neurobiological
Treatability Measure n M (SE) n M (SE)
High Revised Prison Sentence (yrs.) 55 1.39 (.19) 57 0.69 (.19)
Involuntary Hospitalization Term (yrs.) 1.27 (.17) 1.39 (.17)
Low Revised Prison Sentence (yrs.) 54 1.91 (.20) 57 1.21 (.19)
Involuntary Hospitalization Term (yrs.) 2.02 (.18) 2.59 (.17)
Note. n = sample size, M = mean, SE = standard error
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210584.t001
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when the evidence was described psychologically, (M = 1.64, SE = 0.12, p< .001), than when
the defendant was healthy, (M = 0.46, SE = 0.12). Similarly, neurobiological evidence garnered
significantly longer recommended involuntary hospitalization terms than psychological evi-
dence, p = .040.
As expected, there was also a main effect of treatability status on recommended involuntary
hospitalization terms, F(1, 219) = 31.97, p< .001, ηp2 = .127, indicating that when participants
were told the defendant’s disorder was untreatable, they recommended significantly longer
involuntary hospitalization terms (M = 2.31, SE = 0.12) than when participants were told the
disorder was treatable (M = 1.33, SE = 0.12). However, there was no significant interaction
between the mental health status presented and the treatability of the disorder, F(1, 219) =
1.69, p = .20, ηp2 = .008. These results were consistent with H3 but not H4. See Fig 1 for pun-
ishment change scores by condition.
(H5a) Was the effect of mental health status on prison sentence recommendation best
accounted for by reductions in deontological concerns rather than increases in consequen-
tialist concerns?. We clustered the above items (Cronbach’s alpha> 0.70) into two catego-
ries in accordance with jurisprudence theories of punishment: deontological concerns
(concerns about duty, such as the perceived obligation to punish offenders based on their
moral blameworthiness) and consequentialist concerns (concerns about outcomes, such as the
desire to punish to protect public safety). Items comprising the deontological factor were: the
offender’s moral wrongness, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert of punishment,
control of action, and free will (Cronbach’s α = .86). Items comprising the consequentialist fac-
tor were: the defendant’s dangerousness to society and likelihood of committing future crimes
(α = .77). These clusters were confirmed in a two-factor solution identified by a principal com-
ponents analysis of all items with varimax rotation, resulting in two independent factors
(eigenvalues > 1) that matched our a priori grouping and explained 66.24% of the variance.
We then used an ordinary least squares path analysis to examine whether these two types of
concerns could account for, the observed effect of mental health status (neurobiological or
Fig 1. Punishment change score by condition. Bars denote the percentage change in time from individual baseline
punishment rating across conditions, for their revised prison recommendation (dark grey) and recommendation for
involuntary hospitalization (light grey). Statistically significant differences mirror the patterns described in H1-H4.
Standard error bars shown.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210584.g001
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psychological) on prison sentence term. The two composites were entered into a parallel
regression model in order to compare their relative impact.
One third of the variance in recommended prison sentence length was explained by our
parallel model (R2 = .33). The mitigating effect of neurobiological evidence was fully accounted
for by deontological concerns (See Fig 2). As predicted, the neurobiological condition was a
significant negative predictor of deontological concerns, b = -0.63, SE = 0.14, p< .001, and
deontological concerns were a significant predictor of the prison sentence recommended to
the defendant, b = 0.52, SE = 0.093, p< .001. A bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect
effect of mental health status as explained by deontological concerns on prison sentence, b =
-0.33, SE = 0.088, based on 5,000 samples, was entirely below zero (-0.52 to -0.17). The direct
effect of mental health status on prison sentence was not significant, b = -0.30, SE = 0.17, p =
.081. An identical pattern was observed for the effect of mental health status on the change in a
participant’s prison sentence recommendation pre- and post-mental health status
manipulation.
Consequentialist concerns also significantly predicted prison sentences, b = 0.28,
SE = 0.071, p< .001, but mental health status did not predict consequentialist concerns, b =
-0.24, SE = 0.18, p = .18. A bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of mental health
status as explained by consequentialist concerns on prison sentence, b = -0.067, SE = 0.053,
included zero (-0.18 to 0.030), indicating that consequentialist concerns did not account for
the effect of mental health status on prison sentence recommendation, consistent with our pre-
diction. The observed regression model indicates that the mitigating effect of neurobiological
evidence on prison sentence length can be explained by changes in deontological concerns—
namely that the defendant was seen as less responsible for his criminal act.
(H5b) A test of the effect of deontological and consequentialist concerns on the relationship
between mental health evidence and recommended involuntary hospitalization was not justi-
fied because no direct effect of evidence type on recommended involuntary hospitalization
was observed.
EH1: Was the effect of mental health status on sentence length moderated by (a) coun-
terfactual reasoning traits or (b) emotion regulation ability?. Change in prison sentence
recommendation was subjected to a two-way Analysis of Variance with two mental health sta-
tus conditions (neurobiological, psychological) and two counterfactual reasoning levels (low,
Fig 2. Regression coefficients for the relationship between mental health status and prison sentence as explained by deontological concerns and consequentialist
concerns. Solid bold lines denote a significant relationship.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210584.g002
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high) as determined by a median split. A median split was performed to circumvent problems
of multicollinearity observed using a more conventional, linear regression method. Contrary
to expectation, there was no main effect of counterfactual reasoning level, F(1, 181) = 3.29, p =
.071, ηp
2 = .018, and no interaction, F(1, 181) = 1.42, p = .23, ηp2 = .008, indicating that the
effect of mental health status on prison sentence length did not depend on a participants’ ten-
dency to reason counterfactually.
Similarly, change in prison sentence recommendation was subjected to a two-way Analysis
of Variance with two mental health status conditions (neurobiological, psychological) and two
emotional regulation ability levels (low, high) as determined by a median split. Again, there
was no main effect of emotional regulation level, F(1, 212) = 0.01, p = .93, ηp2 < .001, and no
interaction, F(1, 212) = 0.26, p = .61, ηp2 = .001, indicating that the effect of mental health sta-
tus on prison sentence length did not depend on a participants’ ability to regulate their
emotions.
Additional exploratory analyses
Several exploratory measures were examined to help contextualize and explain the results of
our hypothesis tests.
Were deontological concerns reduced when the defendant’s disorder was described as
neurobiological compared to psychological?. We theorized that any mitigating effect of
neurobiological explanation on prison sentences would be driven primarily by deontological
sentiments that the defendant should be held less morally responsible for the crime. If so, then
participants presented with neurobiological evidence should likewise rate that defendant lower
on measures of responsibility, blameworthiness, deservingness of punishment, free will, ability
to stop himself from performing the crime, and higher on measures of trustworthiness. In this
view, participants presented with neurobiological evidence should also perceive the crime as
less characteristic of the defendant. All of these predictions were supported.
There was a main effect of mental health status on perceptions of the defendant’s moral
responsibility for his crime, F(1, 219) = 16.13, p< .001, ηp2 = .069, his blameworthiness, F(1,
219) = 15.09, p< .001, ηp2 = .064, his deservingness of punishment, F(1, 219) = 12.26, p = .001,
ηp
2 = .053, free will, F(1, 219) = 21.89, p< .001, ηp2 = .091, ability to stop himself from commit-
ting the crime, F(1, 219) = 10.58, p = .001, ηp2 = .046, his trustworthiness, F(1, 219) = 7.82, p =
.006, ηp
2 = .034, and the perception that the defendant’s action was an expression of his essen-
tial character (i.e., his “deep self”), F(1, 219) = 20.91, p< .001, ηp2 = .087. Those in the neurobi-
ological condition saw the defendant as less morally responsible (see Table 2 for exact group
values), less blameworthy, less deserving of punishment, having less free will, less able to stop
himself from committing the crime, more trustworthy, and perceived the crime as less charac-
teristic of the defendant than those in the psychological condition.
In contrast, there was no main effect of treatability status on any of these measures except
trustworthiness, F(1, 219) = 14.63, p< .001, ηp2 = .063, such that when the defendant’s disor-
der was treatable he was perceived as more trustworthy than when the disorder was untreata-
ble. Similarly, there was no interaction effect between mental health status and treatability on
any measure besides trustworthiness, F(1, 219) = 6.82, p = .010, ηp2 = .030, such that the posi-
tive effect of treatability on trustworthiness was larger in the neurobiological condition, p<
.001, ηp
2 = .063. As might be expected, this effect did not extend to the condition in which the
disorder was described as untreatable, p = .90, ηp2 < .001.
Were consequentialist concerns increased when the defendant’s disorder was described
as neurobiological compared to psychological?. We theorized that any aggravating effect of
the neurobiological explanation on involuntary hospitalization would be motivated primarily
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by concerns of the defendant’s future danger to society. If so, then participants presented with
neurobiological evidence should characterize that defendant as more dangerous. However,
this prediction was not supported. Instead, a main effect of mental health status on the defen-
dant’s dangerousness, F(1, 219) = 4.05, p = .045, ηp2 = .018, indicated that participants pre-
sented with neurobiological evidence found the defendant less dangerous than those presented
with psychological evidence. This effect was further supported by an interaction, F(1, 219) =
6.22, p = .013, ηp2 = .028, in which the mitigating effect of treatability, F(1, 219) = 75.23, p<
.001, ηp
2 = .256, on perceived dangerousness was larger when the evidence was described as
neurobiological compared to psychological, p = .002, ηp2 = .045. Pairwise differences were not
found between neurobiological and psychological evidence in the untreatable condition, p =
.74, ηp
2 = .001. One interpretation of these counter-intuitive results is that participants per-
ceived involuntary hospitalization not as a way to incapacitate morally culpable people that
pose a danger to society but as a way to provide medical attention to those most in need of it,
including, potentially, those who pose a danger to themselves—a distinction that our danger-
ousness measure may not have captured.
Was the treatment for the defendant’s condition perceived as more efficacious when
that condition was described as neurobiological versus psychological?. If the aggravating
effect of neurobiological explanation on recommended involuntary hospitalization term was
not due to perceptions of increased dangerousness, perhaps it could be due to a perception
that neurobiological disorders are more treatable than psychological disorders, at least in inpa-
tient contexts. If so, then people should rate the treatment of the neurobiological disorder as
more efficacious. We observed partial support for this hypothesis. There was a significant
interaction between mental health status and treatability, F(1, 219) = 9.64, p = .002, ηp2 = .042,
such that participants presented with neurobiological evidence of a treatable disorder
Table 2. Deontological and consequentialist concerns as a function of mental health status and treatability status.
Psychological Neurobiological Psychological Neurobiological
Treatability M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)
Moral Responsibility Action an Expression of Defendant’s Character
High 6.22 (0.18) 5.53 (0.18) 4.96 (0.21) 3.97 (0.20)
Low 6.28 (0.18) 5.54 (0.18) 5.02 (0.21) 4.16 (0.20)
Blameworthiness Danger to Society
High 5.98 (0.18) 5.23 (0.17) 5.09 (0.17) 4.33 (0.17)
Low 6.06 (0.18) 5.44 (0.17) 6.13 (0.17) 6.21 (0.17)
Deserving of Punishment Likelihood of Reoffense
High 6.02 (0.18) 5.16 (0.17) 3.93 (0.17) 3.39 (0.17)
Low 6.00 (0.18) 5.63 (0.17) 4.98 (0.18) 5.23 (0.17)
Free Will Perceived Efficacy of Treatment
High 5.38 (0.21) 4.18 (0.21) 3.22 (0.14) 3.79 (0.13)
Low 5.28 (0.21) 4.52 (0.21) 1.72 (0.14) 1.46 (0.13)
Ability to Stop Himself Perceived Impact of Evidence
High 4.82 (0.21) 3.97 (0.21) 2.38 (0.14) 1.97 (0.14)
Low 4.69 (0.22) 4.16 (0.21) 3.11 (0.14) 2.53 (0.14)
Trustworthiness Importance of Exam Results
High 2.29 (0.17) 3.18 (0.16) 3.64 (0.16) 4.32 (0.16)
Low 2.09 (0.17) 2.12 (0.16) 3.17 (0.17) 4.00 (0.16)
Note. M = mean, SE = standard error
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210584.t002
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expressed stronger belief in the efficacy of the treatment than those presented with psychologi-
cal evidence of a treatable disorder, p = .003, ηp2 = .040. As might be expected, this effect did
not extend to the condition in which the disorder was described as untreatable, p = .17, ηp2 =
.009. Moreover, there was no main effect of mental health status on the efficacy of the defen-
dant’s treatment, F(1, 219) = 1.28, p = .26, ηp2 = .006.
Were neurobiological descriptions of the defendant’s disorder seen as more important
than psychological descriptions?. Next we examined whether participants expressed explicit
attitudes consistent with the mitigating effect of neurobiological evidence on punishment. If
so, this would support the interpretation that participants were consciously aware of the rea-
sons driving their decision. To address this question, participants indicated the extent to
which they thought the evidence of the defendant’s condition “decreases, increases, or has no
effect on” their initial punishment. They were also asked how important the exam results were
to their punishment decision.
As expected, participants given neurobiological evidence reported the evidence as more
mitigating and more important than those given psychological evidence, F(1, 219) = 12.42, p =
.001, ηp
2 = .054; F(1, 219) = 21.78, p< .001, ηp2 = .090. Similarly, participants told that the dis-
order was treatable reported the evidence as more mitigating and important than those told
the disorder was untreatable, F(1, 219) = 20.62, p< .001, ηp2 = .086; F(1, 219) = 5.87, p = .016,
ηp
2 = .026. There were no significant interactions, F(1, 219) = 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .002; F(1,
219) = 0.23, p = .64, ηp2 = .001.
Discussion
The purpose of this project was to investigate the effect of brain-based evidence of an impulse
control disorder on lay sentencing judgments. We observed three key findings: (1) Both brain
evidence and psychological evidence had mitigating effects on prison sentences, but the miti-
gating effect of brain evidence was stronger. (2) Yet that same brain evidence evoked relative
increases in involuntary hospitalization terms. (3) The variation in sentencing judgments was
best explained by deontological considerations pertaining to moral culpability.
These findings suggest that lay people assign more importance to mental health evidence
whose causes are described in neurobiological terms than in psychological terms. As predicted,
this evidence seems to both favor or disfavor the defendant depending on the decision type:
Although evidence of a neurobiological cause of a disorder may mitigate prison punishment,
the same evidence can place the defendant at an increased risk of involuntary hospitalization.
Though the effect sizes of our primary hypotheses were not large, they are still potentially rele-
vant to the law, where punishment practices and policies can have far-reaching consequences
for society when deployed over large temporal and geographic scales.
One plausible explanation for this effect is that neurobiological evidence primes fact-finders
to preferentially attend to the distinctly physical causes of behavior, and this feeds their intui-
tions that the behavior is outside the defendant’s control. Perceptions of reduced control may,
in turn, reduce attributions of responsibility while potentially increasing the belief that the
defendant requires medical intervention (see [26]).
The mitigation effect is consistent with the operation of a deontological motive for punish-
ment, namely that punishment should be proportionate to the offender’s moral culpability.
The reason for the aggravating effect of neurobiological evidence on recommended involun-
tary hospitalization term is less clear. “Double edge” theories would explain this increase using
consequentialist reasons such as a desire to protect society from danger or a desire to provide
treatment to those who would most benefit from it, but the neurobiologically disordered
defendant was rated as no more dangerous or treatable than the other disordered defendant.
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This leaves open the question of exactly why people assigned more hospitalization time to the
neurobiologically disordered defendant. We speculate that the answer hinges on how people
interpret the specific purpose of involuntary hospitalization. Perhaps, for instance, people con-
sidered involuntary hospitalization more justified for long-term disease management, even if
their treatment prospects are low. Similarly, people in this condition might have felt a greater
obligation to provide care, regardless of treatment prospects. Our manipulation checks did not
make such fine distinctions. If these interpretations are confirmed in future research, they
would be compatible with “moral education theory,” the idea that punishments may be justi-
fied, or perhaps even obligatory, to the extent that they benefit to the person being punished
[36]. Alternatively, involuntary hospitalization could be used to quarantine people perceived
to be ill-fit for society. This interpretation is consistent with previous research suggesting that
people feel the need to socially distance themselves from individuals with biologically
described mental disorders [37–40]. In such cases, increased hospitalization time for defen-
dants in the neurobiological condition should be understood as “aggravating” only in the nar-
row sense that it was defined as involuntary, but not in a classically retributive sense.
This study is the first to quantitatively dissociate the divergent effects of neurobiological evi-
dence on sentencing decisions (i.e., the “double-edged sword”). In a similar vein, research by
Aspinwall et al. [7] and Fuss et al. [18], found that while biological explanations for a crime
mitigated punishment recommendations or estimations of legal responsibility, some increased
consideration of future dangerousness and support for involuntary commitment was found.
However, in those studies, this support was observed by qualitative measures only. The present
study validated this effect using quantitative measures. Further, the dependent measures in
our study allowed participants to award prison time and involuntary hospitalization time sepa-
rately. This approach was employed to distill the moralistic punitive motives from incapacita-
tive and treatment-based motives, and could explain why our study uniquely observed the
predicted double-edge effect.
Limitations and future directions
As with all studies, our findings are necessarily limited by our procedural choices. We included
an alternative measure to prison punishment (involuntary hospitalization) to distill the nature
of participants punitive motives. Even so, involuntary hospitalization itself can be used for a
variety of purposes that we could not disentangle, such as treatment, incapacitation, or possi-
bly even punishment. Efforts to understand participants motivations for such decisions should
consider a wider array of punishment measures designed to fulfill distinct aims or should
devise additional manipulations that achieve this effect.
It is also unclear why participant’s individual differences (i.e., the ability to reason counter-
factually and the ability to regulate one’s own emotions) did not explain individual susceptibil-
ity to change in prison sentence. It is possible that this was a consequence of weak construct
validity. However, these results are consistent with previous literature showing that those high
in cognitive ability are no less susceptible to cognitive biases (and in some cases, more suscepti-
ble) than those low in cognitive ability [28]. Future studies should address these possibilities
using other theoretically motivated individual difference measures.
This study investigated punishment judgments in an Internet-based lay sample and do not
necessarily generalize to legal samples such as judges and jurors or to the broader U.S. popula-
tion. Future research on lay samples should aspire to full randomization across key dimensions
including geography and political party affiliation. Likewise, this research should be extended
to legal samples in attempt to replicate these effects among groups whose judgments are
directly consequential for criminal defendants, such as trial court judges. Lastly, it would be
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helpful to move beyond experimental survey methods and into more realistic presentation
modalities, such as mock trials, to establish greater ecological validity.
Our study design did not permit investigation of potential interactive relationships between
psychological and neurobiological evidence. In real criminal trials, both types of evidence
might be presented together. Inclusion of a combined condition would address whether their
joint presentation might have multiplicative, or perhaps antagonistic, effects on attributions of
responsibility and punishment.
Finally, interpretation of evidence likely depends on the type of crime and mental health
condition portrayed. Our vignettes described a sexual assault in order to increase the plausibil-
ity of the use of involuntary hospitalization, but this choice departs from other studies in this
body of literature. Likewise, the defendant’s mental condition was defined as an “impulse con-
trol disorder.” This decision was made to minimize unknown preconceptions about culturally
loaded labels such as psychopathy, schizophrenia, and psychosis, thus differentiating this study
from others of its kind [7, 8, 21]. Future studies should consider controlling these cross-study
differences or consider other theoretically-motivated causes of behavior including prototypi-
cally physical disorders (e.g., bipolar disorder) as well as prototypically psychological disorders
(e.g., adjustment disorder).
Limitations notwithstanding, these findings are important for criminal law procedure, and
particularly for policy makers, because they highlight a potential contextual effect that has not
been examined in previous research. Specifically, policy makers must confront the question of
how to manage the effects that we observed. For example, when neuroscientific evidence is
introduced to support mental illness arguments, should it be accompanied pro forma by infor-
mation about its potentially biasing effects? Should it be accompanied by information about
the defendant’s amenability to treatment? When may neuroscience evidence stand alone, and
when must it be accompanied by corresponding behavioral evidence? Should judges be
required to receive legal education on neuroscience evidence? Should jurors be entitled (or
required?) to review the treatment options or mandates that would apply if the defendant is
excused on grounds of mental illness? Additional scholarship is needed to examine these and
other practical applications of this research.
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